Structural hazards (T)

Taxonomies › Email infrastructure › Structural hazards
The whole stack · 12 hazards · prefix T
These twelve hazards are properties of email itself, so no single component can fix them. T9 names the one the others rest on: every control is a reader. T10, T11 and T2.1 are what happens when the platform says no: a deferral that outlives the sender’s queue, a bounce that becomes a suppression, and a front end every tenant shares. Apply them to the whole design after the layers.
Scope: Hazards of email itself.

Text version: every entry on this page is in the PDF and Excel downloads on the overview page, where it can be searched and copied.
The hazards
- EM-T11 Delay Becomes Loss
- EM-T10 Suppression After Outage
- EM-T9 The Reader in the Middle
- EM-T8 Envelope and Header Duality
- EM-T7 Hop-by-Hop Trust
- EM-T6 Legitimate Mutation
- EM-T5 Interpretation Differential
- EM-T4 Authentication Is Not Trust
- EM-T3 Legacy Fail-Open
- EM-T2.1 Shared Infrastructure, Shared Outage
- EM-T2 Shared Infrastructure, Shared Fate
- EM-T1 Check Once, Use Later
Where this group touches others
- Availability: What happens when the platform says no is split by who owns the decision. Delay Becomes Loss (EM-T11) and Suppression After Outage (EM-T10) are hazards: they sit on the sender’s queue and the sender’s suppression list, which the receiver does not own. False Rejection (EM-OP-10.1) and Control-Plane Blackout (EM-OP-5.1) are the platform’s own operational decisions, a change that goes live unreviewed and a console that shares fate with the data plane, so they sit under their parents in operations and storage. Shared Infrastructure, Shared Outage (EM-T2.1) is the pipeline’s concentration (EM-DP-2, EM-DP-6). Resource Exhaustion (EM-SM-6) is the effect each of them produces.
- Readers: MIME and S/MIME (EM-MI-9), the content scanner layer and operations and storage (EM-OP-A, EM-OP-7, EM-OP-Q, EM-OP-6) each assume a component that holds plaintext. The Reader in the Middle (EM-T9) is the structural hazard behind all of them: the control and the exposure are the same component.
- Tenancy: Tenant Confusion (EM-DP-7), Cross-Tenant Identity (EM-AU-K) and Shared Reputation Poisoning (EM-SM-8) each cover a different face of shared infrastructure (configuration, identity, reputation). Shared Infrastructure, Shared Fate (EM-T2) is the structural hazard behind all three.
STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE
Of the 12 entries here, STRIDE fits none of them cleanly. CAPEC 3.9 has a pattern that describes 2 of them directly, only a generic parent pattern for 5, and nothing for 5. CWE 4.20 names the weakness directly for 2, has only a broader weakness for 9, and nothing for 1. The table below gives the mapping entry by entry, with the names of the CAPEC patterns and CWE weaknesses; what the mapping shows across the whole taxonomy is in Mapping the Email Threat Taxonomy to STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE. The Excel, SKOS and STIX downloads carry the same mapping as text.

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© 2026 Jonathan Brett Crawley. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 with additional permissions: see the licence on the email infrastructure overview.